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FREE SPEECH AND NEWSPAPER ADVERTISING

RESOLVING THE FREE SPEECH-FREE PRESS DICHOTOMY: ACCESS
TO THE PRESS THROUGH ADVERTISING
Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to
argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties.
-Milton, Areopagitica'
Probably no other statement has been so vehemently defended by democratic spokesmen as Milton's plea for freedom of expression. Yet today that
freedom is threatened by the press. The Fourth Estate that has been protected
by the first amendment as the voice of free expression is now one of its most
threatening foes. The effect of the "big business" concept of the newspaper
industry, editorial exigencies, and restrictive advertising regulations has been
to cut off one of the most important avenues of expression for the individual.
The result is that the concepts of free press and free speech are found in
opposition to each other; and in the case of the newspaper industry, the
courts have held the former to be controlling.
This note is an attempt to describe the increasing incidence of suppression
of free expression in the nation's newspapers. This suppression gives rise to
the free press-free speech dichotomy.2 It is asserted that a positive view of
the first amendment requires that access to the press be afforded the individual.
Further, the right declared by newspapers to decline to accept advertisements
at will cannot apply where the advertiser is exercising his constitutionally
protected freedom of expression. Free speech, as a preferred freedom, must
not be allowed to be impaired by the capricious acts of press management.
THE LEGACY OF FREEDOM

Centuries ago, Aristotle taught the necessity of free exchange of ideas in
the search for truth,3 and these views are echoed in the structures of today's
political institutions. Freedom of speech was placed first in the Bill of Rights,
for the framers saw that a "popular government without popular information
or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy: or
perhaps both." 4 Colonial Americans were especially concerned with free
speech, 6 for it was largely an effort to escape from limitations on this per6
sonal and individual right that brought them to this country.
The courts have been eloquent in their defense and expansion of the free
speech concept. 7 The Supreme Court has given first amendment freedoms a
1.

FREE PRESS ANTHOLOGY 16 (T. Schroeder ed. 1909).

2. See also Note, The Duty of Newspapers To Accept Political Advertising-An Attack
on Tradition, 44 IND. L.J. 222 (1969).
3. "Mhe ability to raise searching difficulties on both sides of a subject will make us
detect more easily the truth and error about the several points that arise." AISrOTLE,
ToPzGA bk. 1, ch. 2, cited in THE BAsic WoRs OF ARISTOTLE 189 (R. McKeon ed. 1968).
4. THE COMPLErE MADISON 337 (S. Padover ed. 1953).
5. M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEEcH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 113 (1966).
6. H. DRINKER, SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOUR FREEDOMS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
4 (1957).
7. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S, 254, 269 (1964), for a selection of the
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preferred position whenever various interests have been balanced, 8 and has
continued to press for the understanding that free politics is meaningless without the freedom of each citizen to talk politics freely. 9 The limitation on
Congress has been extended to the states by the incorporation of the first
amendment into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 10
The role of free expression extends beyond the political arena. It is an
important part of the "self-righting" process,11 so important to society as a
whole. 12 Today, in a time of societal revolution, the principle of open discussion is "a method of achieving a more adaptable and at the same time
more stable community, of maintaining the precarious balance between
healthy cleavage and necessary consensus."', - As the dissenting factions in
society become stronger, the need for achieving this balance becomes increasingly important.
In the American experience, Holmes' "marketplace of ideas"', has been
the pages of the nation's newspapers. Jerome Barron, in his article Access to
the Press-A New First Amendment Right,15 argues persuasively that the
"soap box is no longer an adequate forum for public discussion."' 6 "If a
group seeking to present a particular side of a public issue is unable to get
space in the only newspaper in town, is this inability compensated by the
availability of the public park or the sound truck? '" The answer is obvious:
the newspaper has no real rival as the most influential disseminator of new
ideas in the community. It is still widely maintained that democ-acy cannot
function properly without a free press,"' for it still shoulders the burden of
disseminating the information vital to a knowledgeable populace.9 Because
most popular excerpts.
8. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509
d946); Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Weaver v. Jordan, 411
P.2d 289, 293, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537, 541 cert. denied, 385 U.S. 844 (1966).
9. M. SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 108. The importance of this preferred position is
reinforced by those who reject balancing first amendment questions altogether. Frantz sees
the first amendment mandate as a "thunderous 'Thou shalt not abridge.'" Frantz, The
First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1449 (1962).
10. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500 (1952), lists the long line of
authority incorporating the first amendment into the fourteenth, beginning with Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
11. Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNIcATIONS 24 (1947) (a report from the
Commission on Freedom of the Press).
12. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting): "But
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe
even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas ......
13. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
884 (1963).
14. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
15. 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967). For a more recent expansion of his theories see
Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access to the Media?, 37 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 487 (1969).
16. 80 HARV. L. REv., supra note 15, at 1656.
17. Id. at 1653.
18. E.g., Goodhart, Freedom of Speech and Freedom of the Press, 1964 WASH. L.Q. 248.
19. The fact that the press is the most effective means of expression is useful in con-
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of this important role, provisions were made in the same amendment that
expressed the nation's concern for free expression20 to protect that industry
from governmental interference. The first amendment simply states that
Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of the press. A free press
has been viewed as playing such an important role in maintaining a balanced
society that it guarantees free expression by its very unbridled existence.
Recent developments in the newspaper industry, however, cast doubt on the
validity of this assumption.
F EE SPEECH vs. FREE Ppmss

Free expression and the press do not go hand-in-hand.2 1 Speech is not
necessarily "free" in the press. Since it forms the center of the process of
dissemination of ideas, the press is the force that can most effectively abridge
expression by nullifying the opportunity for an idea to obtain public exposure.
Two developments in the operation of the newspaper industry have led to
restrictions on free expression. First, ownership has been concentrated into
the hands of a comparatively few "big businessmen." Second, the managers
of mass communications have retained tight control over both the content of
information disseminated and the availability of the media as a forum for
expression.
Concentrationof Ownership and the Eliminationof Competition
Diversity in the media for communication of facts and ideas has always
been considered basic to the democratic process. 22 Concentration of ownership
and control in the newspaper industry poses a serious threat to that process.
In wide regions of the nation diversity is being replaced with a single set of
facts or a single body of opinion because of the emergence of newspaper monopolies and other noncompetitive situations. The public interest is not
served by giant communications empires, for their dominant tendency to limit
the scope of news and discussion constitutes a clear threat to a free and responsible press.23 Despite consciousness of their responsibilities on the part of
news editors the danger remains that freedom for minority expression will be
curtailed.

2

4

stitutional questions only to show the importance the role of the press has to free speech
protagonists. Insofar as abridgment of speech is concerned "one is not to have the exercise
of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be
exercised in some other place." Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939). The fact
that the soap box is available is legally irrelevant.
20. See United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd,
326 U.S. 1 (1945).
21. Contra, 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law §213 (1956): "Freedom of the press and freedom of speech generally are the same, being distinguished only in the form of utterance."
22. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
23.

INTERNATIONAL

TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION,

FEDERAL

RESPONSIBILITY

FOR A

ComPErrrvx PRss 70 (1963).
24. Nixon, Concentration and Absenteeism in Daily Newspaper Ownership, 22

FMn

AND

JOURNAL-

Ismz Q. 97, 114 (1945).
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The newspaper industry has experienced a steady decrease in the number
of dailies as the population and number of cities have increased. 25 One observer has predicted: "American cities with competing newspapers will soon be
as rare as those with two telephone systems." 2- 6 In most multi-newspaper cities,
the newspapers are under common ownership, and Table 1 in Appendix I
shows that ninety-six per cent of American cities are served by monopoly
presses. Even in the very largest cities - where a few competing dailies remain
- the total number of papers has been reduced,2 7 as evidenced by the almost
yearly obituaries written by the survivors for some of their oldest and most
famous counterparts. Intercity chains are also employed by some expansionistic monopoly presses.2 8 Thus, not only do monopoly newspapers enjoy a wide
influence through circulation in rural areas, but those rural families that
receive more than one newspaper from different cities are frequently reading
products of the same chain.
The decline in competition stems in large measure from economic factors. 29 Substantial amounts of capital and expert management are necessities

for the operation of a successful newspaper. As a necessary response to an
"economic squeeze," what was once a profession is now becoming merely a
business. 30 The business orientation of the media managers has been seized
upon as a cause of the "fading consciousness of the newspaper function,"' 1
which is seen as the source of many of the failures of modern journalism. The
freedom of the journalist - the freedom most Americans see as synonymous
with the first amendment - is no greater than that which the publisher will
allow. Each journalist is limited to some extent by the standards and regulations set up by his employer, and the monopoly situation tends to minimize any effect liberal standards of competing newspapers might have. Thus,
the publisher has the freedom to control his "business," and ownership ot

25.

0.

VILLARD, THE DISAPPEARING DAILY 3 (1944).

26. A. LIEBLING, THE PREss 27 (1964).
27. Appendix I, table 2 infra.
28. The trend in intercity chains is to "more intensive and less extensive" coverage, indicating that national chains are not as popular as smaller, regional groups. Nixon & Ward,
Trends in Newspaper Ownership and Inter-Media Competition, 38 JOURNALISM Q. 3, 4
(1961).
29. High-speed presses are a natural inducement for consolidation within a city. In fact,
William Randolph Hearst, Jr. has stated that monopoly operations increased profits two-andone-half times over two competitors. INTERNATIONAL TYPOCRAI'IICAL UNION, supra note 23,
at 54. Newspaper businessmen are eager to buy out competitors and to stave off newcomers. Even 25 years ago a $10 to $15 million investment was required to start a metropolitan newspaper (0. VILLARD, supra note 25, at 5), so initial financing is difficult especially in face of the arsenal developed by the entrenched paper. This arsenal includes special
advertising and circulation inducements and exclusive contracts with vendors. INTERNATIONAL
TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION, supra note 23, at 41. Even where competitors exist, a newspaper
cannot build up a special interest audience so advertising goes to the newspaper that is a
bit larger, creating a spiral effect that bankrupts the paper that was once an almost even
competitor. D. LACY, FREEDOMs AND COMMUNICATION 52-53 (1965).
30. Preface to 0. VILLARD, THE DISAPPEARING DAILY at v (1944).
31. C. LINDSTROM, THE FADING AMERICAN NEWSPAPER 143 (1960).
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many newspapers in widely scattered areas has the effect of forcing the adop32
tion of a pattern sufficiently bland and undifferentiated to suit them all.
Further, the inevitable influence of the big business communications system
operates powerfully, if perhaps unconsciously, to fix an unchallenged consensus around the dominant view of the mass audience. 33
The problems of blandness that have plagued the broadcast industry
since its inception have crept into the newspaper business; this is largely
due to the latter's appeal for larger circulation. As individuals are exposed
daily to the effects of the mass media, an uncritical acceptance of the image
projected by the media threatens to stifle autonomous and critical judgments
of events. 34 Majority views are thus overemphasized, and these tend to prevail at the expense of minority views that do not readily attract mass
attention.35 Thus, the failure of the press to provide a forum for free expression creates a fundamental problem: minority ideas cannot gain entry
into a system that, because of economic exigencies, is interested only in the
mass audiences that will continue to renew subscriptions. Justice Douglas,
commenting off the Bench, expressed the problem another way: 36
Money-makers have taken over the press. They want readers and advertisers; and so they cater to the low common denominator in the
populace. To that fact must be added the further one that the owners
are largely conservative. The result is a press which with few exceptions gives no true account of forces at work in the world.
The fact that newspapers have been economically forced into a monopoly
situation would be less significant were it not for the charge that the monopolies are controlled by "like-minded individuals." 37 Although this assertion cannot be empirically proved, the common assumption that conservatism
follows wealth cannot be wholly dismissed.38 It is significant here because the
extreme editorial position taken by some publishers would seem almost by
definition to influence the amount of space given to liberal, minority views39
32. This certainty is not an inescapable conclusion, but it appears to be the fact in many
situations. Id. at 146.
33. D. LAcy,FREoas AND COMMUNICATIONS 72 (2d ed. 1965).
34. Id. at 32-33.
35.

Id. at 69.

36. C. Lnimsmom, supra note 31, at 163.
37. Z. CmIF, supranote 11, at 15.
38. The analogy has been drawn that if Senators were required to have $10 million and
House members $1 million, we would expect the conservatism of these groups to rise
sharply. "In the same sense, we have a free press today." Anybody with $10 million may buy
a large-town newspaper; or $1 million a small-town paper. These few corporate owners
"because of their economic position form an atypical group and share an atypical outlook."
A. LImLING, supra note 26, at 15-17.
39. Three sample excerpts cited in 1966 Wis. L. Rxv. 632, 667-69 are illustrative: "It
seems to us that this organized disloyalty verges on criminal syndicalism and should be
prosecuted as such .... A stop must be put to this business. The government must act

and it must act in the toughest way possible." Chicago Tribune, Oct. 19, 1965, at 18, col. 1.
"[A]s is usually the case, a handful of kooks and Communists on the American scene have
been given publicity in the world press far out of proportion to their number or influence."
Dallas Morning News, Oct. 20, 1956, at 1, cols. 1-2. "U.S. citizens who burn . . .draft cards
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Aside from limitations on access to the press resulting from exigencies of
economic conditions and managerial political leanings, editors are forced to
contend with external influences as well. Concentrations of power in other
industries exert both direct and indirect pressure through the much condemned "advertiser squeeze." 40 Beyond this more overt influence, editors are
guided by subscribers41 who expect to be told certain things and not others,
and this increases the desire to tell readers what they want to hear. Majority views are more likely to dominate the paper's columns as public opin42
ion unwittingly sets its own limits on what is to be communicated.
It is significant that the Federal Communications Commission has been
concerned with a similar tendency toward consolidation in broadcasting,
especially broadcast consolidations involving newspaper interests. This situation has given rise to a "concern contained within the broader 'primary objective' of encouraging a maximum diversification of control of the media of
mass communications. '- 4 3 The growth of the broadcasting industry brought
with it hopes that radio and television could offset the one-sided influence of
newspapers, but the majority of programming is overwhelmingly influenced
by advertisers that seek out the majority view through polls.44 The fairness
doctrine imposed by the FCC prevents a major network from identifying with
one side of a political issue, 5 but that doctrine also tends to suppress any expression of controversy because of the additional burden of "seeking out" the
other view.46 Although broadcasting does not lend itself to providing for
free expression to the same extent as the press, the FCC has been cognizant
of the industry's tendency to narrow the scope of the views presented. It was
and march against everything that the country stands for should be punished . . . .This
is the time for "police" brutality if there ever was one . . . And we suggest that Lady
Bird's 'beautification' campaign should begin in a big way by wiping out the anti-war
marchers in every city .... Jackson Daily News, Oct. 20, 1965, at 8, cols. 1-2.
40. Despite claims of reduced pressure by advertisers because of the diversity of advertising sources and because of the acceptance by advertisers of the principle that money
buys only white space (Wiggins, The Press and Conflicts of Interest, 24 FED. B.J. 358,
364-65 (1964)), it is still asserted "that in the long run they get what they want." C. LINDsTROM, supra note 31, at 120-21. Increased advertising control is a natural corollary to increased national advertising money and fewer papers. Dependence on the newspaper as an
advertising medium may prevent the advertiser from threatening an editor with loss of
his account, but a flexible budget with other media can mean the difference between a
lucrative account and one that may barely break even. The growth of chains makes an
even tighter line of communication of pressure from national advertiser interests. I',-rERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION, supra note 23, at 157-59.
41. H. HOLT, COMMERCIALISM AND JOURNALIsM 37 (1909).
42. THE PRESS AND SOCIETY 18 (G. Bird & F. Merwid eds., 4th ed. 1957).
43. Toohey, Newspaper Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 20 Fa. Co.Mi. B.J. 44 (1966).
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has recently instigated another study of
ownership of broadcast interests by conglomerates and others with large-scale business
interests. The study is looking to possible benefits as well as detriments to the public
interest, including hazards to the fair and free presentation of information. No. 18449
(F.C.C. Feb. 7, 1969), 37 U.S.L.W. 2474 (Feb. 18, 1969).
44. D. LACY, supra note 33, at 70.

45. Barron, In Defense of "Fairness": A First Amendment Rationale for Broadcasting's
"Fairness" Doctrine, 37 U. COLO. L. REv. 31, 38 (1964).
46. Id. at 34.
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this tendency that the fairness doctrine was designed to correct. The press
has no such governmental control even though the same tendencies have
appeared in that communications medium.
Controls Within the Medium
There are three alternatives available to the person seeking access to the
press: (1) to develop a situation that the news editors will deem worthy of
coverage; (2) to obtain the sympathy of the editorial staff or of an opinion
columnist or to write a "letter to the editor"; or (3) to purchase an "advertorial."47
The newspaper editor has a problem of selection since the size of the
newspaper is controlled by the amount of advertising sold for a given issue.
Most publishers designate a given percentage of the space available in the
edition for noncommercial copy, and the selection of materials to fill this
portion of the edition is the prerogative of the editorial staff. This role of
editorial selection is the subject of the free press guaranty, and courts and
commentators have steadfastly held this right of editorial freedom to be
inviolate. 4s Limited space necessitates a denial of access for some ideas;4 9
therefore, the editor's discretion is often the most criticized source of suppression. Careful choice of editors will assure editorial selection consonant
with the views of the publisher, and the first amendment rejects any interference with this prerogative. Although editorial policy established by the
publisher and the editors is a first limit on expression, it is a valid one. This
limitation is the essence of the concept of a "fourth estate."
Advertising columns are not subject to the same mechanical and economic
necessities. Since the size of the newspaper is directly proportional to advertising volume, the addition of a page of advertising not only automatically
creates space for its presentation, but creates a proportional amount of
editorial space. Every newspaper has developed an intricate set of regulations
for advertising acceptability. Obviously, advertising regulations must be for
reasons other than for economic necessities.50
47. "Advertorials" are editorial advertisements of the type involved in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964), as distinguished from commercial advertisements
whose ultimate purpose is the furtherance of a profitmaking enterprise and that do not
purport to be expressions of speech as contemplated by first amendment protections.
48. Professor Barron may have been suggesting a method of making an exception
to this general proposition for the purpose of allowing access, but there are no indications
that this position is supportable. Barron, Access to the Press -A New First Amendment
Right, 80 HARv. L. Rxv. 1641 (1967). See also Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment:
Observations on Forty Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REv. 67, 159

(1967).
49. On the other hand, "letters to the editor" are the most obvious example of an
open opportunity to gain access to the medium for expression. However, this opportunity
is necessarily dosed by space limitations. One need only guess at the number of letters received daily by The New York Times to recognize that editorial discretion again is a
necessary evil. See also Lord v. Winchester Star, Inc., 346 Mass. 764, 190 N.E.2d 875 (1963).
Since this selection is normally limited to popular controversies, the unpopular cause or
the individual voice is again thwarted in its striving for expression.
50. There are obvious mechanical limitations on type size, preferred position, and un-
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Of a sampling of twenty-three Florida dailies, 51 all but one5 2 have implemented the following advertising regulation: "The subject matter, form, size,
wording, illustrations and typography of all advertising is subject to the
approval of the publisher.' ' 5 3 The practice of including this regulation on
advertising is nation-wide. s4 Other regulations relate to specific problem areas
that publishers often encounter 5 but they still implement the "catch-all"
regulation that serves notice on any prospective advertiser that his advertisement may be refused without cause.
The purpose of this wide discretion is unclear, although it is often justified in terms of protection of the reader26 This concern for reader sensitivity
might explain the widespread use of the term "good taste" as a criterion for
acceptability. 7 Another obvious rationale is the protection of the newspaper's
own advertising resources by maintaining the "integrity" and believability of
the newspaper, thus guarding its long-range effectiveness as an advertising
medium.' 8 The newspaper's own image in the eyes of the reader is also at
stake. If the advertising department exercises strict control over content, the
readers may justifiably view an advertisement as an endorsement by the
publisher. 59
Exceptions to the general "right to refuse" policy are not carved out for
usual printing techniques. Such regulations, to the extent they are applied without discrimination and undue restriction of trade have been upheld. Wirta v. Alameda-Contra
Costa Dist., 434 P.2d 982, 990, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430, 438 (1967). See also Note, supra note
2, at 234.
51. Daytona Beach News-Journal, Ft. Lauderdale News, Gainesville Sun, Jacksonville
Times-Union, Lakeland Ledger, Ocala Star-Banner, Orlando Sentinel-Star, Palatka News,
Palm Beach News, Panama City News-Herald, Pensacola News-Journal, St. Augustine Record,
Tallahassee Democrat, Palm Beach Post, Winter Haven News-Chief, Sarasota HeraldTribune, Ft. Myers News-Press, Ft. Pierce News-Tribune, Hollywood Sun-Tattler, Miami
Herald, Tampa Tribune, St. Petersburg Times, Today.
52. Gainesville Sun.
53. NEWSPAPER RATES AND DATA (SRDS) 25 (April 12, 1969).
54. This regulation is enforced by, among others, The New York Times, The Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune, and the San Francisco Chronicle-Examiner.
55. SRDS lists forty-six standard regulations, which include provisions for objectional

medical advertising, printing errors, simulation of editorial copy, advertisements without
borders, et cetera. NEWSPAPER RATES AND DATA, note 53 supra. Newspapers publish their own
wording of the regulations listed by SRDS, but the effect is identical.
56. See, e.g., THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE, ADVERTISING ACCEPTABILITY GUIDE I: "To protect the
interests of readers and advertisers, the Chicago Tribune established a code of advertising
acceptability standards."
57. See Appendix I infra (questionnaire replies from The Washington Post, The
Miami Herald, and the St. Petersburg Times).
58. TIlE CHICAGO TRIBUNE ADVERTISING ACCEI'ITABILITY GUIDE ("The purpose of the
standards outlined in this Advertising Acceptability Guide is to help advertisers maintain
the honesty, integrity and good taste which will increase the effectiveness of their advertising."); THE NEW YORK TIMIES, STANDARDS OF ADVERTISING ACCEPTABILITY 2 ("The intent of
these standards is to encourage and preserve believability in advertising and to multiply its
impact and effectiveness"; Note, Developments in the Law: Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1005, 1153 (1967).

59. Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 434 P.2d 982, 989, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430,
437 (1967).
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noncommercial advertisements, except for special regulations applicable to
political advertising during election campaigns. The New York Times seems
to be the only major newspaper that has expressed any concern about the
rights of advertisers. In two different editorials The Times recognized its
duty to publish controversial advertisements as a part of the first amendment
guaranty of open communication of ideas60 It appears that the Chicago
Tribune takes an opposite approach in its requirement: "Advertising of a
controversial nature is acceptable only if approved by a Tribune divisional
61
advertising manager."'
Appendix II illustrates how several newspapers treated sample advertorials
submitted to them. 'Regardless of how it words its refusal, every newspaper
retains an unrestricted right to censor or exclude any advertorial. The New
York Times is in the minority in recognizing the exceptional nature of advertorials, but even The Times may interpret its broad regulations to exclude
62
controversial material.
Every newspaper department is undeniably influenced - at least through
hiring practices - by the management and ownership of the paper. The daily
decisions of editorial selection and advertising acceptance or rejection reflect
that influence. The assumption that expression in the press is "free" is not
a day-to-day reality. A businessman's approach to newspaper operations leaves
little place for the rights of members of the public to express themselves
when such rights conflict with the efficient operation of the business. Newspaper management reserves the right to decide for itself what shall be allowed
or denied effective expression.
The "Right To Refuse" Theory
The St. Petersburg Times gives its advertisers an accurate statement of
63
the law:
It has been repeatedly held by the courts that a newspaper is private
business - not a public utility, and that it may publish or reject whatever advertising it wishes if it is contrary to its standards or ethics and
advertising acceptability, and not in any way a discriminatory manner.
The only reported case recognizing a duty on the part of a newspaper
publisher to accept and publish an advertisement is Uhlman v. Sherman,4
decided in 1919. All authoritative precedent except Uhlman holds that the
publishing business is strictly a private enterprise, and therefore is under no
legal obligation to sell advertising to all who would buy it.65 The courts
60. The New York Times, Dec. 28, 1961, at 26, col. 1; Dec. 20, 1963, at 28, col. 2.
61. Tim CHICAGO TRIBUNE, ADVERTISING ACCEPTABILITY GuIDE 17 (emphasis added).
62. See questionnaire reply from The New York Times, Appendix II infra.

63.

ST. PETERSBURG TIEs,

ADVERTISING STANDARDS

oF ACCEPTABILITY

23.

64. 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 225, 31 Ohio Dec. 54 (1919). This decision was almost immediately overruled by Sky High Theatre, Inc. v. Gaumer Publishing Cd. (Ohio unreported No.
22820), cited in Bloss v. Federated Publications, Inc., 5 Mich. App. 74, 145 N.W.2d 800

(1966).
65.

Bloss v. Federated Publications, Inc., 380 Mich. 485, 487, 157 N.W.2d 241, 242 (1968);
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have found no rule at common law forbidding newspapers from discriminating
among customers, and in the absence of a statute to the contrary they have
found no authority for establishing such a rule. 66
Two coinciding factors underlie these results. First, the free press concept
has made courts reluctant to place a public utility label on newspapers.
Second, most rejected advertisements have been commercial in nature. The
decisions carefully point out that newspapers are strictly private enterprises 7
and are not clothed 68 or affected- 9 with the public interest that would place
them in the category of a public utility.70 The first amendment basis for this
hesitation is suggested in Bloss v. Federated Publications, Inc.,71 where the

court held that to safeguard the first amendment declaration "that well informed citizens are essential for the preservation of democratic institutions
...
an independent press is indispensable .. . ."72 This concept of free enterprise has been extended to uphold the right of the publisher to refuse legal
notices, even where a statute requires publication.73 It is important to note
that in every case, except where legal notices were involved, the messages
submitted for publication were purely commercial. Content of the advertisement has not been a consideration in these decisions.
Since accepting or rejecting advertisements is seen as purely a business
function, the courts have relied upon the inherent right to refuse to maintain trade relations 7T and have held it "immaterial whether such refusal is
based upon reason or is the result of mere caprice, prejudice, or malice."' ;
The publisher's control of the press in a wide area has also left the publisher's right to refuse unaffected by competition3. 6 In a competitive market,
the fact that someone else would accept the advertisement would be a deterrent to arbitrary refusal.
The overwhelming authority of case law has been embodied in section
762 of the Restatement of Torts, 77 which states that a person is not liable for
Mid-West Elec. Coop. v. West Texas Chamber of Commerce, 369 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1963).
66. Approved Personnel, Inc. v. Tribune Co., 177 So. 2d 704, 706, 709 (Ist D.C.A. Fla.
1965); Shuck v. Carroll Daily Herald, 215 Iowa 1276, 1278, 247 N.W. 813, 814 (1933);

Poughkeepsie Buying Serv., Inc. v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc., 205 Misc. 982, 983, 131
N.Y.S.2d 515, 517 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
67. Shuck v. Carroll Daily Herald, 215 Iowa 1276, 247 N.W. 813 (193).
68. In re Louis Wohl, 50 F.2d 254 (E.D. Mich. 1931).
69. Approved Personnel, Inc. v. Tribune Co., 177 So. 2d 704, 706 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1965).

70. J.J. Gordon, Inc. v. Worcester Tel. Publishing Co., 343 Mass. 142, 177 N.E.2d 586
(1961).
71. 5 Mich. App. 74, 145 N.W.2d 800 (1966), afJ'd, 380 Mich. 485, 157 N.W.2d 241 (1968).
72. Id. at 78, 145 N.W.2d at 804.
73. Mack v. Costello, 32 S.D. 511, 143 N.W. 950 (1913).
74. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Friedenberg v. Times
Publishing Co., 170 La. 3, 127 So. 345 (1930); Camp-of-the-Pines, Inc. v. New York Times
Co., 184 Misc. 389, 401, 53 N.Y.S.2d 475, 486 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
75. Poughkeepsie Buying Serv., Inc. v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc., 205 Misc. 982,
983, 131 N.Y.S.2d 515, 517 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
76. Approved Personnel, Inc. v. Tribune Co., 177 So. 2d 704 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1965);
J.J. Gordon, Inc. v. Worcester Tel. Publishing Co., 343 Mass. 142, 177 N.E.2d 586 (1961).
77. RFSrATEMENT OF ToRTs, Explanatory Notes §762, comment a at 37-38 (1939).
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unintended harm as the result of refusing to enter into a business relation
with another. The editors comment that an enterprise must be free to select
its business relations or perish, and they expressly include refusals between
newspaper and advertiser.7 8 The law appears to give the publisher of a newspaper an unlimited right to accept or refuse advertisements without any
requirement that he consider any higher duty of the press as a medium of
expression.
Speech Without a Voice
The press is controlled by individuals who regard it primarily as a business
investment. Through control over both editorial and advertising policies,
management can deprive an individual of the only means of effective expression in the modem mass media society - capriciously, arbitrarily, and without
reason. Consequently, the communications system fails "to afford something
more than the shallow and vacuous re-echoing of the forms of traditional
beliefs, and provide substance for the individual hammering out of new
insights."79 But more immediately, the individual may find himself arbitrarily
deprived of his freedom of speech. The mass media have moved away from,
rather than toward, acting as a sounding board for expression. Although
courts have found that "monopoly in the mass communications of news and
advertising is contrary to the public interest, even if not in terms proscribed by
the antitrust laws"8s and have decried the extinction of competition and "clash
of opinion," 8' they have failed effectively to remedy the situation. The courts'
refusal to tamper with the protection afforded the press by the first amendment has placed a vehicle of effective expression in the hands of a select few
82
who are committed to the status quo.
As a result of this judicial abstinence, one cannot always disseminate his
ideas through traditional channels. To gain admission into the media, ideas
must be presented in a way that disrupts social order - a process opposite
that contemplated by constitutional guarantees. 83 Picketing was upheld in
Thornhill v. Alabama4" because it was the only means of communication available, but picketing may not be effective in many situations. 85 Pickets are find78. Id. §762, comment d at 39.
79. D. LACY, supra note 33, at 24.
80.

Mansfield Journal Co. v. Federal Communications

Comm'n,

180 F.2d 28, 33

(D.C. Cir. 1950).
81. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 603 (1953).
82. Preface to 0. VILLARD,THE DISAPPEARING DAILY at vi (1944).
83. Barron, supra note 48, at 1646-50. "These 'public issue' demonstrations are important to the individual . . . because in an 'open society there must be the ability to advocate views in the hope of changing existing preconceptions or convictions. . . . This need
has fostered the accompanying doctrine that the individual must be afforded an appropriate
'public forum' for his peaceful protests." Davis v. Francois, 395 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 1968).
For examples of intentional exclusion of news items see Note, The Duty of Newspapers To
Accept Political Advertising-An Attack on Tradition, 44 IND. L.J. 222 (1969).
84. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
85. Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 -HARv. L. REV. 1191,
1207-08 (1965).
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ing it increasingly difficult to gain entry into the mass media, even as news
items.
The first amendment's frustration by a system that was thought to embody
its goals is paradoxical. The press was given constitutional protection because
it was thought to be the key to free expression. The courts have embraced
this concept in upholding editorial freedom and taking care to prevent the
press from falling under state control by means of a public utility classification. The belief that liberty is attainable only through the absence of governmental restraint" 6 has been found to be unrealistic in the context of modern
society, and the reiteration of the laissez-faire doctrine of press is only a
romantic vestige.57 Under present interpretations, free press inhibits free
speech.
A

POSITIVE VIEW OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

A contemporary threat to free speech is posed not by governmental restraint but by social power, for private restraints and public censorship may
equally defeat this essential element of a democratic societyAss The propensity
to suppress expression 9 is no less in private sectors than in government.
Was the first amendment enacted to sanctify the views of the corporate
owners of the mass media? At the time the amendment was drafted, newspapers were carriers of public opinion because they were predominantly opinion-oriented collections of "letters to the editor." 90 Admittedly, "[t]he modern
daily newspaper is an institution of news dissemination that was unknown to
the early common law,"' 91 yet the law has not taken judicial notice of this
new situation. A modern concept of freedom of expression would not allow
itself to be "trammeled by the combined self-interest of those who enjoy a
unique constitutional position precisely because of the public dependence on
a free press." 92 The traditional concern that restrictions by the government
will lead to serious infractions of liberty should give way to the realization
that more serious infractions come from the press itself. Freedom from the
press is now as crucial to the individual as is freedom of the press. 93
To accept the tenet that free government is dependent upon free expression is to see a positive purpose in the negative words of the Constitution. 94
86. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
87. Barron, supra note 48, at 1641.
88. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
89. J. S. Mill wrote of this tendency: "The disposition of mankind, whether as rulers
or as fellow citizens, to impose their own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on
others, is so energetically supported by some of the best and by some of the worst feelings
incident to human nature ...." J. S. MILL, THREE ESSAYs 20 (1966).
90. Barron, supra note 48, at 1642.
91. Firstamerica Dev. Corp. v. Daytona Beach News-Journal Corp., 196 So. 2d 97, 99
(Fla. 1966); Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 187, 146 So. 234, 238 (1933).
92. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 29 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
93. Donnelly, Government and Freedom of the Press, 45 Nw. U.L. REV. 31, 46 (1950).
94.

Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUPREE

COURT

REV. 245,

263 (1961).
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The wording of the amendment states plainly that Congress shall not abridge
freedom of speech or of the press. To the authors this may have seemed
simple enough, but a different problem arises when the press itself abridges
freedom of speech. Is the protection of the press to be allowed to defeat its
own purpose by denying government its positive role in protecting speech?
The legal concept of absence of censorship has always had a definite popular
meaning: the right of unrestricted discussion of public affairs. Undoubtedly,
this was the intended purpose of the amendment, 95 but the two guarantees
have been allowed to develop separately so that they are now in opposition
to one another.
The Constitution was written at a time when it was thought that laissezfaire doctrines guaranteed freedom. The viability of this assumption is
questionable in contemporary society; there is no essential conflict between
freedom and government. 96 The press is one area in which the government
itself may encourage the development of one of the essential elements of selfgovernment,9 7 where a true concept of free expression has not been attained
98
by a laissez-faire doctrine. "Public discussion is a political duty" and is to be
99
encouraged to insure its effectiveness. When the means of public discussion
become unreceptive to new or controversial ideas, it becomes imperative that
the state take a positive role in reversing the trend and guarantee the individual's basic rights.100 The hypotheses that liberty increases as governmental
power decreases and that government is the sole enemy of liberty have be0
come outmoded in the face of suppressive private social power.' '
There are some positive indications that courts are recognizing the
danger that the "freedom of a few" concept poses to free expression. The
Supreme Court in Time, Inc. v. Hill ° 2 stated in dictum: "Those [constitutional] guarantees are not for the benefit of the press so much as for the
benefit of all of us. A broadly defined freedom of the press assures the maintenance of our political system and an open society."' 0 3 The Florida supreme
0
court, also speaking broadly, stated the positive view more strongly: 4

95.

Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNrrED STATES

18-21

(1941).

96. Donnelly, note 93 supra.
97. See INTERNATIONAL TYPOCRAPHICAL UNION, FEDERAL RESPONSIBILIrY FOR A FREE
AND CoMrNTIvE PRESs 165; Meiklejohn, supra note 94, at 252.
98. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
99. Cole Fischer Rogow, Inc. v. Carl Ally, Inc., 29 App. Div. 2d 423, 288 N.Y.S.2d 556,
564 (Ist Dep't 1968). Some of the ways in which government actively encourages the press
are described in Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 3-4 (1947), and some of
the subtle ways it may encourage are at 478.
100. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REv.
1641 (1967); Gorlick, Right to a Forum, 71 DICK. L. REv. 273, 275 (1967).
101. Blaine, Equality, Fairness and 315: The Frustration of Democratic Politics, 24
MD. L. REv. 166, 177 (1964).
102. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
103. Id. at 389. The concern of the court here was that large damages in libel suits
might restrict speech.
104. Firstamerica Dev. Corp. v. Daytona Beach News-Journal Corp., 196 So. 2d 97, 99
(Fla. 1966).
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Freedom of the press was never intended to be a special privilege extended to its publishers. On the contrary, it was conceived by the
writers of the Constitution and of the Bill of Rights to be a right of
the people in a democracy to unrestricted information and presentation of views on government for which the press was a tailor-made
medium of dissemination. Freedom of the press, therefore, is a
people's personal right rather than a property right . . . Freedom of
the press therefore ends at that point where private rights begin or
are infringed upon.
In another case an Oregon court reemphasized that "freedom of the press
is a right which belongs to the public; it is not the private preserve of those
who possess the implements of publishing."105
This approach to the first amendment is difficult to apply in the face of
remaining questions. Is the age-old principle of the Areopagitica applicable
to the business-minded mass media of today? Can - or will - the press
allow governmental intrusions to insure individual guarantees of free speech?
ACCESS To THE PRESS THROUGH ADVERTISING

Professor Barron, one of the few commentators advocating the positive
view of the first amendment, has suggested a "fairness doctrine" for the
press. 06 There is no evidence, however, that the government would provide an
atmosphere more conducive to heterodoxy any more effectively than does
private supervision.107 The problem of choice would only shift from one
censor to another, and the ultimate decision of what ideas to exclude as
unworthy of expression would still have to be made.
Governmental interference with the newspaper's editorial discretion is
most undesirable; fortunately, it is not the only alternative. An application of the first amendment to free speech type advertisements could provide
an equally effective means of access to the press. Advertorials have been found
to be an effective and relatively inexpensive way to express ideas not recognized as worthy of comment by editors. 08 McLuhan has observed that editorials are ignored unless put in the form of news or advertising.19 This
indicates that the advertorial may be even more desirable as a means of
expression than the publisher's own format, the editorial, since readers give
at least equal attention to news copy and to advertisements.1" The Supreme
Court recognized the value of the advertorial to free speech in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan:"'
105.
106.

State v. Buchanan, 436 P.2d 729, 731 (Ore. 1968).
Barron, note 100 supra.

107. Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations of Forty Years of
Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67, 162 (1967).

108.

Advertisements

are described as an integral

part of a concerted

program of

Vietnam dissension in Finman & Macaulay, Freedom To Dissent: The Vietnam Protests and
the Words of Public Officials, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 632, 644 et seq.
109. M. McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: Tiii EXTFNSIONS OF NIAN 186 (1964).

110.
111.

Id. at 187.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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Any other conclusion would discourage newspapers from carrying
"editorial advertisements" of this type, and so might shut off an important outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by persons who do not themselves have access to publishing facilities- who
wish to exercise their freedom of speech even though they are not
members of the press. . . . The effect would be to shackle the First
Amendment in its attempt to secure "the widest possible
11 2dissemination
of information from diverse and antagonistic sources."
Should not the courts take a more affirmative role than merely taking care
not to "discourage" acceptance of controversial advertisements by the press?
The ability to rent or use the mass media - the ability to buy advertising
space 1" s - is a clear alternative to a "fairness doctrine." Yet it is clear that
this alternative is not presently available. Reasons given by the newspapers
for refusing to open this alternative without unnecessary restrictions are
weak. Media spokesmen recognize the right to advertise as a corollary to free
speech"1 4 and the better publications readily admit a definite obligation to
the public,15 but management nonetheless reserves the right to refuse.
Advertisements that appear in a publication seem to have the endorsement
of the publisher solely because he holds himself out as the protector of the
public's welfare. The necessary corollary is that what appears has passed the
publisher's tests of acceptability. An open policy toward advertorials would
implicate the publisher in no way. Indeed, the editors have the right to
contradict any advertorial in its own editorial columns - editorial space
made available because of the purchase of the advertorial11 Sale of advertising space should be viewed by the public and by the publisher as just
that: sale of white space only. An open advertising policy clearly expressed
17
can make the newspaper's position very clear."
Vague notions of free enterprise and freedom of contract have protected
even the most capricious limitations placed on acceptance of advertising by
the publishers. There are indications that this veil may now be pierced.
The Demise of the "Right To Refuse" Theory
In Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District,"Is a group called
"Women for Peace" attempted to place the following advertisement in space
made available in motor coaches:
112. Id. at 266.
113. J. WIGGINS, FRo_
mOOR SEcRECY 167-70 (1956).
114. THE PRESS AND SocIETY 168 (G. Bird & F. Merwid eds., 4th ed. 1957).
115. F. THAYER, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE PRESS 646 (1962); The New York Times, Dec.
28, 1961, at 26, col. 1; Dec. 20, 1963, at 28, col. 2.
116. The newspaper always expands to accommodate advertising plus a proportional
amount of editorial space.
117. Questionnaire reply from The New York Times, Appendix II infra. In both
editorials The Times stated: "[W]e think the principle of freedom of the press not only
requires us to report events and occurrences of which we disapprove . . . but also imposes
on us the obligation to accept advertising of books whose contents we reject and of political
parties and movements whose goals we despise."
118. 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967). An excellent comment is in 10 Wms. &
MARY L. Rxv. 244 (1968).
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"Mankind must put an end to war or war will put an end to mankind."
-President John F. Kennedy.
Write to President Johnson: Negotiate Vietnam.
The advertisement was refused under a policy that excluded all political
advertising except during campaigns. Recognizing the group's right to the
advertising space, the court held, with one dissent, that the content of the
advertisement was protected by the first amendment and that the transit
authority "having opened a forum for the expression of ideas by providing
facilities for advertisements on its buses, cannot for reasons of administrative convenience decline to accept advertisements expressing opinions and
9
beliefs within the ambit of First Amendment protection."1
Wirta was followed very recently in Hillside Community Church, Inc. v.
City of Tacoma,120 where the court denied the city the right to refuse antiwar advertisements on its bus line. The court adopted the test used in
Terminiello v. Chicago,121 that free speech must be protected unless it is

shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive
evil.
A motion for summary judgment was denied in a very similar case, Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority."'2 There, the poster to be displayed contained the photograph of a napalm-burned child. The court held
3
such refusal is conthat, since refusal to accept constituted state action,"'2
sistent with the first and fourteenth amendments only if to prevent a serious
1
and immediate threat to the safe and efficient operation of subways. 24
This trend toward allowing access to public facilities for protest activities12 5
was recently extended to a school newspaper in Zucker v. Panitz,126 where
a school principal had prohibited an anti-war advertisement on the grounds
that it was not a school-related activity. In granting relief to the advertiser,
the court cited Wirta and ruled that the protest was very much a schoolrelated activity, and that the principal could not preclude the students from
expressing their views.

27

119. Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 434 P.2d 982, 984-85, 64 Cal. Rptr.
430, 433 (1967).
120.

455 P.2d 350 (Wash. 1969).

121. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
122. 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
123. Id. at 441. This was the first time a private company was made a codefendant.
Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access to the Media?, 37 GEo. WVAshl. L.
REV. 487 (1969).
124. 274 F. Supp. 438, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
125. Barron, supra note 123, at 488 n.l.
126.

37 U.S.L.W. 2684 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 1969).

127. The court placed this case in the context of recent protest movements: "This lawsuit arises at a time when many in the educational community oppose the tactics of the
young in securing a political voice. It would be both incongruous and dangerous for this
court to hold that students who wish to express their views on matters intimately related
to them, through traditionally accepted nondisruptive modes of communication, may be precluded from doing so by that same adult community." 37 U.S.L.W. at 2684, 2685 (S.D.N.Y.
May 15, 1969).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol22/iss2/6

16

Douberly: Resolving the Free Speech-Free Press Dichotomy: Access to the Pre
1969]

FREE SPEECH AND NEWSPAPER ADVERTISING

Although these decisions were carefully couched in "state action" terms,
they represent a significant departure from the "right to refuse" theory. They
stand as new precedent for the proposition that free speech type advertisements
are an important part of the free speech guarantee, and that unwarranted
refusal is a violation of the first amendment. The fact situations covered by
these decisions are analogous to refusals by publishers to accept advertorials.'2 8
A significant distinction is that there is no way to reply to transit posters
as there is to a newspaper advertorial. If compared, then, it would seem
that a transit authority would have an even stronger right to refuse.
Commentators have found a few analogies between commercial advertising
and free speech, 129 but there is little indication that the framers of the Constitution intended to give first amendment protection to commercial advertising.130 Nevertheless, when an advertisement is the medium for noncommercial
expression, constitutional freedoms apply in spite of its commercial nature.1 ' '
First amendment freedoms apply to any publication that "affords a vehicle of
information and opinion,"' 132 and noncommercial messages are given priority
1 33
protection from governmental interference.
This protection has been superseded by freedom of contract in the area
of the press. Even though freedom of contract is rooted in the Constitution,
it is not without exception, 3 4 and restrictions on this right are found where
refusals to carry on business relations are "sufficiently inimical to the public
interest as to warrant limitation."' 35 An example is the use of the right to
contract to restrain trade or to create a monopoly. 36 In upholding a newspaper's right to refuse to maintain trade relations, the court in Poughkeepsie
Buying Service v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers 37 held that limitations on that
right "must be found either in firmly established common law principles or

128. See Appendix I infra.
129. Note, supra note 85, at 1194.
130. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939);
J.J. Gordon, Inc. v. Worcester Tel. Publishing Co., 177 N.E.2d 586 (Mass. 1961); J. G.RALD,
Tin PRass AND THE CONsTITUTON, 1931-1947, 160 (1948); Note, supra note 85, at 1195.
131. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964); Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147, 150 (1959); Weaver v. Jordan, 411 P.2d 289, 297, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537, 544 (1966);
In re Philipie, 414 P.2d 949 (Nev. 1966); Cole Fischer Rogow, Inc. v. Carl Ally, Inc., 29 App.
Div. 2d 1423, 288 N.Y.S.2d 556, 564 (1st Dep't 1968).
132. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
133. In Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 434 P.2d 982, 986-87, 64 Cal.
Rptr., 430, 434-35 (1967). the court gives some interesting examples of what happens when
the priorities are reversed.
134. Commonwealth v. Boston Transcript Co., 249 Mass. 477, 483, 144 N.E. 400, 401-02
(1924). See Comment, Newspaper's Refusal To Accept Advertising, 3 B.C. IND. & COMM. L.
REv. 522, 523 (1962), for a discussion of liability predicated upon a concept of prima fade
tort.
135.

Comment, Publishers of a Newspaper Under No Obligation To Accept Advertising,

37 NoTRE DAME LAw. 575 (1962).
136. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951); J.J. Gordon, Inc. v.
Worcester Tel. Publishing Co., 177 N.E.2d 586, 588 (Mass. 1961); F,THAYR, supra note
115, at 711.
137. 205 Misc. 982, 131 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 1954),
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• . . for the public good."' 13 s Surely the fundamental personal right of free

expression is sufficiently "firmly established" to require restriction of the
lesser right to contract. These two competing rights require the traditional
balancing tests faced by courts in most constitutional questions. The preferred
position of the first amendment freedom of speech weighs heavily in the
39
balance, however, and has prevailed in most contests.
With the exception of Wirta, Tacoma, and Kissinger, the first amendment
has not been applied in the courts' decisions. In light of the position of the
Supreme Court, however, it is apparent that these preferred rights would
strongly outweigh rights incident to free enterprise. The contract theory maintained by publishers still controls in examples of purely commercial advertisements, but it cannot be said to be completely valid concerning advertorials.
Discrimination among views by newspaper management for reasons of
personal prejudice or public reaction is antagonistic to traditional free speech
and free press concepts. Since free speech was intended primarily to protect
minority views,' a° popularity can hardly be a criterion for determining acceptability for the marketplace.141 That an idea is too controversial or objectionable to the majority of the readers is no reason to suppress it, 1 42 for this

constitutional protection does not turn upon "the truth, popularity, or social
utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered." 113 The price of free speech
includes "suffering the clamor and disturbance, the elevated emotions and
postures of defiance, which are generated by giving the voice of dissent free
reign."'14 Because of pressures from public opinion and outside interests,
newspapers tend to avoid controversial issues with which publishers do not
personally sympathize or agree.145 This position ignores the first amendment's
most important clause.
138. Id. at 984, 131 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
139. In re Ithaca Journal News, Inc., 57 Misc. 2d 356, 282 N.Y.S.2d 920, 925 (City Ct. of
Ithaca 1968). There, freedom of the press was balanced against the right to a fair trial and
was forced to give way. When first amendment freedoms were balanced in Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946), Justice Black stated: "When we balance the constitutional rights
of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion,
as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position.
As we have stated before, the right to exercise the liberties safeguarded by the First Amendment 'lies at the foundation of free government by free men' and we must in all cases
'weigh the circumstances and ... appraise the . . . reasons . . . in support of the regulation
...of those rights.'" [citing Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)].
140. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). "The majority may freely
assert its beliefs and is secured freedom of speech by the very fact of its mathematical majority. It is the minority, whether of the left or the right, which must overcome accepted
views." Huntley v. Public Util. Comm'n, 442 P.2d 685, 689, 69 Cal. Rptr. 605, 609 (1968).
141. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966); Huntley v. Public Util. Comm'n, 442 P.2d
685, 689, 69 Cal. Rptr. 605, 609 (1968).
142. Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority, 274 F. Supp. 438, 443 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
143. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 291 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 449 (1962).
144. Wirta v. Alamieda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 434 P.2d 982, 989, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430,
437 (1967); Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 473, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924, 932 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
145. THE PREss AND Soci-TY 78 (G. Bird & F. Merwid eds., 4th ed. 1957).
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The argument that alternative media are available is equally untenable.
"Restraints on freedom of speech are not justified simply because alternative
forms of expression are available.146 As long as the medium sought is an
appropriate one, the availability of other media is irrelevant. 147 Furthermore,
a true test of opportunity for expression lies in the opportunity to gain access
to a medium with the largest impact, rather than in the abundance of alternatives. 48 The newspaper has been used as the major medium in most
commercial campaigns, with other media 149 used in supplementary efforts only.
The superiority of the printed word is especially true in relation to new ideas
that need the lasting record that newsprint can give. 5 0 Effective communication of a new idea in the broadcast media or on a tree stump can be achieved
only by expensive repetition.
In an attempt to overcome "right to refuse" advertising regulations, the
above arguments of free enterprise and alternative media must be met, but
the most formidable obstacle to be overcome is the state action concept of
the fourteenth amendment. There must be either a circuitous path around
the concept, or the newspaper industry must be shown to qualify under state
action.
In no case except Uhlman has the label of "clothed with the public
interest" been attached to the newspaper industry, but arguments favoring
such a posture have been convincing. In Commonwealth v. Boston Transcript
Co.,25' the Massachusetts court recognized that newspapers "may perhaps"
fall within the definition of a "business clothed with a public interest" described in Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court. 5 2 To hear publishers speak
of their role of service in the community, one is convinced of at least a tacit
devotion to the public. Indeed, it is just such a devotion that the first amendment must have contemplated. The Wolff court stated that the circumstances
need only be such as to create a close relationship between the public and
the business with an affirmative obligation to be reasonable in dealing with

146. Huntley v. Public Util. Comm'n, 442 P.2d 685, 691, 69 Cal. Rptr. 605, 611 (1968).
See also Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
147. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).

148. Barron, supra note 100, at 1653. "Nor does the restriction become permissible
because it merely limits the manner of expression rather than the initial right to communicate." Huntley v. Public Util. Comm'n, 442 P.2d 685, 688 (1968).
149. I.e., direct mail, radio and television publicity.
150. 0. ViLLARD, THE DISAPP.ARING DAILY 28 (1944).
151. 249 Mass. 477, 144 N.E. 400 (1924).
152. 262 U.S. 522, 535 (1923): "Businesses which though not public at their inception

may be fairly said to have risen to be such and have become subject in consequence to
some government regulation. They have come to hold such a peculiar relation to the public
that this is superimposed upon them. In the language of the cases, the owner by devoting
his business to the public use, in effect grants the public an interest in that use and subjects
himself to public regulation to the extent of that interest although the property continues
to belong to its private owner and to be entitled to protection accordingly." Two other
classes of businesses were described: those carried on under authority of a public grant
of privileges and those involved in certain public occupations, See also Commonwealth v.
Boston Transcript Co., 249 Mass. 477, 144 N.E. 400 (1924).
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the public.153 The newspaper industry, with its affirmative obligation to dis-

seminate ideas and news to the public, qualifies under this definition of a
business clothed with public interest.154
Fine lines of distinction have segregated the newspaper industry from the
field of "public" businesses. The court in Mack v. Costello15 suggested that
the press is a "quasi-public business" because it is a public necessity, but the
court refused to see the newspaper as anything but strictly a private business."56
First amendment provisions were not at issue, however, and there is evidence
that constitutional considerations could have made a difference in the determination. The interest of the community invaded by the business should
be a material consideration. 157 If the only interests to be considered are those
of the merchant, it is easy to see why the importance of defining the newspaper as "public" was not evidenced in prior cases. If the determination
"depends on the nature of the business, on the feature which touches the
public, and on the abuses reasonably to be feared,"' 158 then a consideration
of the rights to expression that are suppressed by newspapers should go
toward defining the newspaper as more "public" than the courts have done
in early cases.159 The nature of the activity - here, as the means of procuring
first amendment rights - must be considered.160 While the functions of the
press are not entirely governmental in nature, 1' they are indispensable to
the extent that the government must take affirmative action to preserve the

153. Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U.S. 522, 536 (1923).
154. If it does not, it can only be that the difference is a matter of degree. Comment,
supra note 135, at 578.
155. 32 S.D. 511, 143 N.W. 950 (1913).
156. Id. at 515, 143 N.W. at 951. Contra, see INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION,
FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A FREE AND COMPETITIVE PRESS 70 (1963).
157. Comment, Public Service Corporations-Newspapers
as Affected with a Public
Interest, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 314, 315 (1931). The test of access is not so much a publicprivate dichotomy as it is a question of how crucial the access is under the circumstances.
Barron, supra note 123, at 494.
158. Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U.S. 522, 539 (1923); Southwest Util.
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 52 F.2d 349, 352-53 (10th Cir. 1931), afJ'd sub. nom., New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
159. "[U]nder some circumstances property that is privately owned may, at least for
First Amendment purposes, be treated as though it were publicly held." Amalgamated
Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 316 (1968).
160. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I,
27-28 (1945), explained how these free speech functions cast a different light on judicial
considerations: "But in addition to being a commercial enterprise, it has a relation to the
public interest unlike that of any other enterprise pursued for profit. A free press is indispensable to the workings of our democratic society. The business of the press . . . is
the promotion of truth regarding public matters by furnishing the basis for an understanding of them. Truth and understanding are not wares like peanuts or potatoes. And
so, the incidence of restraints upon the promotion of truth through denial of access to the
basis for understanding calls into play considerations very different from comparable restraints in a cooperative enterprise having merely a commercial aspect."
161. Functions that are considered "governmental" are described in Baldwin v. Morgan,
287 F.2d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1961).
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functions for which the press was created and protected. A medium of free
discussion must be maintained.162
Although the courts are reluctant to hold essentially private activities
to be state action, they do not say that private groups could never effect a
deprivation of equal privileges under the law,163 and there are some encouraging decisions where the threatened rights are weighed. 64 More often
the issue arises as one of state inaction: where the state has by inaction permitted rights to be abridged by private individuals,65 those private actions
take on qualities of state action. It is also argued that the fourteenth amendment was not restricted to state action,166 and the Supreme Court recently
ignored the state action argument altogether when a statute was found to be
meaningless unless it was held to contemplate private action.167
Shelley v. Kraemer 6s offers an alternative means of satisfying the state
action limitation placed on the first amendment by the fourteenth. Applying
the Shelley doctrine, if a court refuses to uphold the claim of an individual
who has had his advertorial refused by a newspaper, the court's adjudication
is sufficient to constitute state action. Participation by the state would consist
of enforcement of the publisher's regulations, and no other action is necessary
on the part of the state. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,69 for example,
the state did not encourage the police commissioner to sue. "Yet the Court,
hardly pausing even to consider the question of state action, held that a
libel judgment . .. [violated the first amendment through the fourteenth].
The fact that Congress and the state legislature had 'made no law' was apparently irrelevant to this determination.3'7o
Another alternative is to declare the newspaper to be a public forum, for
it has been indicated that if the newspaper holds itself out generally to the
public as affording a means of communication, it cannot later discriminate371

162. See generally Note, The Duty of Newspapers To Accept Political Advertising-An
Attack on Tradition,44 IND. L.J. 222, 223 (1969).
163. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 662 (1951).
164. Comment, State Action Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Remaining Scope of Private Choice, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 473, 489 (1965).
165. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); St.
Antoine, Color Blindness but not Myopia: A New Look at State Action, Equal Protection,and
"Private" Racial Discrimination,59 MxcH. L. REv. 993, 1010-12 (1961).
166. H. FLACK, THE ADOION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 262-63 (1908); FRANz,
Congressional Power To Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73
YALE J. 1353, 1354-55 (1964); St. Antoine, supra note 165, at 995.
167. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 424 (1968) (construing 42 U.S.C.

§1982).
168. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
169. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
170. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 693-94 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert denied, 392 U.S. 1016
(1969). "There can now be no doubt that the application by the judiciary of the state's
common law, even in a lawsuit between private parties, may constitute state action which
must conform to the constitutional strictures which constrain the government." Id. at 691.
171. Bloss v. Federated Publications, Inc., 380 Mich. 485, 490-91, 157 N.W.2d 241, 244
(1968) (Adams, J. dissenting); Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 58 Cal. 2d 51,
55, 434 P.2d 982, 985 (1967); Gorlick, Right to a Forum, 71 DICK. L. REv. 273, 275.
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This is a strong argument if the press is to be accorded any characteristics of
a public interest concern, especially since use of the newspaper as a forum
1 72
should not be an anomalous use.

Whether state action is satisfied by considering the press to be sufficiently
impressed with the public interest, by the Shelley doctrine, or by avoiding it
altogether, it is clear that the Constitution will not allow newspapers to enforce advertising regulations that significantly impair the individual's freedom
of speech.17 3 When the "right to refuse" concept is used against advertorials,
redress should be available to the individual in the courts. Precedent as it
applies to commercial advertising is inapplicable to free expression type advertisements. Access to the press through advertising should become a recognized constitutional right.
THE BROADCASTING ANALOGY

In the broadcasting industry, the government has assumed a regulatory
position, and its performance in this capacity has been the subject of much
criticism. Since the limit of governmental influence has been extended from
merely allocating airways to control of programming, regulation of ownership, suppression of competitive enterprises,'74 and even to concern with
content of advertisements, 1 7 5 the newspaper industry is forced to take an ex-

treme position against any type of government interference for fear of the
same controls being imposed upon the press. Since the reasons for regulating
broadcasting and not the press 76 are breaking down' 77- especially the totally
172. Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUPREME COURT
REv. 1, 12 (1965).
173. "Once this 'state action' is established, the question then becomes simply 'whether
the particular state action in the particular circumstances, determining legal relations
between private persons, is constitutional when tested against the various federal constitutional restrictions on state action.' " Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
quoting from Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 30 S. CAL L. REV. 208, 209 (1957). State action requirements should be easily
satisfied when refusal by state university publications is involved. Most of these newspapers
are directly connected to the state either through student government associations or
through the administration. The FloridaAlligator at the University of Florida, for example,
is partially financed by student government, but the president of the university is named
as the publisher by the board of regents. In BOARD OF REGENTS OPERATING MANUAL §7.42D
(rev. ed. Sept. 27, 1968), it is stated: "The university, as owner of all student publications,
will allow for the development of such free discussion of current issues and problems ...
The President of the university, as publisher, has final authority and responsibility in matters
relating to student publications." Zucker v. Panitz, 37 U.S.L.W. 2684 (S.D.N.Y. May 15,
1969), is practically on all fours. See discussion accompanying note 126 supra.
174. A good synopsis of government activities regarding broadcasting may be found in
Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and
Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REv. 67 (1967).
175. Television Station SCOS-TV, 9 P. & F. Radio Reg. 2d 1423 (1967); Comment, FCC
Fairness Doctrine - Applicability to Advertising, 53 IOWA L. REv. 480 (1967).
176. These arguments are summarized in Robinson, supra note 174, at 151. See generally Comment, note 175 supra.
177. See generally Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy, and the First Amendment, 10
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unsupportable position that broadcasting stations are more scarce than
newspapers 78 - publishers fear a "fairness doctrine" may soon be applied
79
to newspapers as well.
If governmental action is limited to guaranteeing advertising space to
those who desire it for expression purposes, fears of a corollary of government
oppression are unfounded. There is no suggestion of any obligation on the
part of the publisher outside the very elementary one of allowing his advertising columns to assume the role of a forum for free (but paid) expression.
There is no corollary duty of a "fairness doctrine" or a "seek-out" rule suggested here as exists in the broadcast industry. 80 The only mandate from the
government would be that personal prejudices of the publisher may not
deny an individual access to the communications media. Opposing views may
be asserted by the publisher in the editorial columns or from other advertising
placed by opposing interests. The mandate of the first amendment will have
been fulfilled: access will have been granted.
CONCLUSION

The frustration experienced by those who can find no effective medium
of expression is both acute and paradoxical. Professors, politicians, judges, and
newspaper publishers themselves laud the benefits of free expression in a
democratic society, and they pledge themselves to keeping the avenues of
expression open; yet publishers can and do exclude from the pages of their
newspapers any ideas they deem undesirable.' 8 ' So far, the courts have refused to exert any power to rectify this inconsistency. There is some indica-

J. LAw & EcoN. 15, 16 (1967).
178. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943);
Z. CHAFEE, GovaRNNI
r AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 638 (1947). For another view, see
Barron, In Defense of "Fairness": A First Amendment Rationale for Broadcasting's "Fairness" Doctrine, 37 U. CoLo. L. REv. 31, 39 (1964); Coase, The Federal Communications
Commission, 2 J. LAw & ECON. 1, 14 (1959); Sullivan, Editorials and Controversy: The
Broadcaster's Dilemma, 32 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 719, 759 (1964).
179. This was proposed in Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right,
80 HARv. L. Rzv. 1641 (1967).
180. Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 434 P.2d 982, 989-90, 64 Cal. Rptr.
430, 437-38 (1967).
181. The "Smothers Brothers crisis" at CBS demonstrated how the media managers
can extoll the virtues of free expression while at the same time taking steps evidently aimed
at curtailing the expression of disagreeable ideas. The "Smothers Brothers Comedy Hour"
was dropped from the CBS schedule in April 1969, amidst charges of undue censorship by
network management. Before dropping the show, network censors edited out several antiwar segments of programs, ostensibly as a part of their responsibility to see that viewers
are not offended by programming. A few months earlier, Dr. Frank Stanton, President of
CBS, made the following comments at a convention of Sigma Delta Chi, a professional
journalistic society: "Because society has achieved such an excess of power and knowledge
beyond its ability to manage, there may be some who believe that we cannot afford . . .
free flow, interchange and clash of ideas ....
I am not one of them. But none of us can
afford to sit complacently by and assume that this gathering storm will spend itself or
blow over." Hentoff, Who Controls TV?, 33 Loox, June 24, 1969, at 27.
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tion of an increased recognition by the judiciary of the seriousness of the
problems involved,ls 2 but no cases have reached the appellate level that
clearly involve first amendment issues so as to overrule the precedent affirming
the "right to refuse" concept. Wirta and Kissinger are the clearest hopes for
a new trend in this direction. The remaining problem is to bridge the state
action gap as applied to independently owned newspapers. The recognition
in those cases that advertising plays a vital role in the ability of the individual to obtain a means of effective expression is essential to a realistic
understanding of the plight of those wishing to express minority views.
If the press is allowed to continue to close its pages to controversial ideas,
the fate of new ideas is destined for the wastecans of editorial assistants and
advertising acceptability departments. The remedy proposed here is that the
courts make a clear distinction between existing precedent, which applies
only to purely commercial advertising, and other situations that would involve first amendment free expression. The chilling effect of newspaper regulations that retain the right to refuse are fully supported by decisions that
have not considered the injury to free expression resulting from this laissezfaire attitude. The way is clearly open for a test case that will put at issue the
ability of newspapers to capriciously cut off the most effective avenues of
free expression.1'3 Remedial legislation is certainly more desirable, but also
less feasible in view of the lobbying power of the press.
To require newspapers to open their pages to all advertorials is to approach
the type of free speech and press the framers of the Constitution envisioned.
It allows a forum for expression, but it does not disturb the press-government
relationship that has always kept governmental influence from controlling the
press. Irate publishers will cry'18 that this is only a foot in the door, but the
effect will be that publishers' prejudices will no longer have free reign over
the ideas of others. This seems a small price to pay for the preservation of one
of our most precious freedoms.
WILLIAM

M.

DOUBERLEY

182. A Michigan appellate court recognized that "[t]here may come a time when the
highest courts in our land may modify or alter the established common law rules applicable
to newspapers, or reasonable and constitutional regulations applied by statute," but the
court found itself bound by precedent. Bloss v. Federated Publications, Inc., 5 Mich. App.
74, 145 N.W.2d 800, 804 (1966). Upon further appeal, a dissenting justice stated: "Certainly
our decision should not be so broadly stated as to preclude future plaintiffs-political candidates, commercial enterprises, governmental units - from the right to insist upon access to
newspaper coverage upon equal terms where a newspaper controls the sole means of daily
paid printed communication within a given area and the newspaper has held itself out
380 Mich. 485, 491, 157 N.W.2d 241 (1968)
generally to the public as affording such ....
(Adams, J.). See generally Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access to the
Media?, 37 GEo. WASH L. REV. 487, 488 n.l (1969).
183. The emerging right of access to the press can best be handled by the courts at
this time. Barron, supra note 182, at 495 et seq. The American Civil Liberties Union, at the
1968 Biennial Conference in Ann Arbor, Michigan, expressed its willingness to bring suits of
this nature. Cranberg, New Look at the First Amendment, SATURDAY REV., Sept. 14, 1968,

at 136-37.
184. One interest of the newspapers must be considered here. If newspapers are to yield

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol22/iss2/6

24

Douberly: Resolving the Free Speech-Free Press Dichotomy: Access to the Pre
FREE SPEECH AND NEWSPAPER ADVERTISING

1969]

APPENDIX I
TABLE 1: DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY SINCE 1880185

1930

1940

19441945

19531954

1960

1880 1909-1910 1920
2202
1207
509
42.2
518
42.9

2042
1295
716
55.3
743
57.4

1942
1402
1002
71.5
1114
79A

1878
1426
1092
76.6
1245
87.3

1744
1396
1107
77.3
1279
91.6

1785
1448
1188
82.0
1361
94.0

1763
1461
1222
83.6
1400
95.8

689

552

288

181

117

87

61

850
Total Dailies
389
Total Daily Cities
149
One-Daily Cities
38.3
Per cent of Total
Total Noncompetitive 150
38.6
Per cent of Total
Cities with
239
Competition

Illustrative of this trend is the fact that from 1920 to 1960, while circulation more than
doubled, cities with competing dailies decreased by eighty-nine per cent, cities with only one
daily increased by seventy-one per cent, and one-combination cities-a single owner of more
86
than one newspaper-increased by four hundred ninety-three per cent.'
TABLE 2: POPULATION ANALYSIS OF DAILY NEWSPAPER CIES187

Population Group
Less than 10,000
10,001-25,000
25,001-50,000
50,001-100,000
100,001-200,000
200-001-300,000
300,001-400,000
400,001-500,000
500,001-1 million
Over 1 million
Total

Total Noncompetitive
1961
1945

-

414
529
223
139
58
17
9
6
5

-

-

534
454
166
78
31
11
4
1

1279

1400

Total Competitive
1961
1945
14
21
17
15
20
6
8
2
9
5

3
10
7
9
8
2
2
3
12
5

117

61

white space without any strings attached, they cannot be held responsible for material
printed in this manner. To protect the publisher from expensive litigation as in the
Time and Sullivan cases, the responsibility for what is printed in advertorials must be
borne by the advertiser. It is axiomatic that "the same limits that the law puts on a newspaper, the newspaper must put on its advertisers." J. WIGINS, FREEDOM OR SECRECY 172
(1956). If the newspaper is to be held liable for the content of its advertorials - whether
under tort theory or criminal liability-it cannot allow them to go to the presses unchecked.
"Reasonable regulations" will always be necessary. See notes 50, 55 supra; Comment, Free
Press: Newspaper Discretion to Refuse Advertising in Monopoly Situation, 53 MINN. L. REV.
853, 860 n.37 (1969).
185. Nixon & Ward, Trends in Newspaper Ownership and Inter-Media Competition,
38 JOURNALISM Q. 3, 5 (table I) (1961).
186. INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION, FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A FREE AND
COMPETITIVE PRESS 43-44 (1963).
187. Nixon 8- Ward, supra note 185, at 7 (table II).
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1
From 1910 to 1962, the number of chain newspapers increased by 933.9 per cent, 8s
cutting the number of states with competitive dailies in half from 1945 to 1963.1S9
This control extended to 34.4 per cent daily and 45.2 per cent Sunday circulation in
the United States in 1962.190 This is an increase from one-fourth of the daily press controlled
by ninety-three chains in 1955.191

APPENDIX II
In an attempt to determine application of the "right to refuse" policy by newspapers to
specific advertisements, a questionnaire posing the following questions was sent to ten of
the Nation's foremost newspapers:
I. SRDS lists the (newspaper) as subscribing to the following regulation: "The subject
matter . . . wording, illustrations and typography of all advertising is subject to the approval of the publisher." What standard is used in applying this regulation?
2. Do you have a separate standard to apply to noncommercial "advertorials"?
3. At whose discretion may advertisements be rejected? Are your acceptance standards
printed?
4. Would you accept a 3-col. x 5-inch advertisement, paid in advance, with the following
copy:192
"Mankind must put an end to war or war will end mankind."
President John F. Kennedy
Write to President Johnson: Negotiate Vietnam.
Women for Peace
Box 1344, (City)
5. Would you accept an ad with a half-tone of a burned child and copy reading:
Don't be a murderer. Don't help destroy an innocent nation. Resist the draft.
Women for Peace
Box 1344, (City)
6. Would you accept the following ad?
Communists can't be worse than capitalists!
For more information, write P. 0. Box 1344, (City)
7. If any of the above would be rejected, what are your specific reasons?
8. For what general reasons do you retain this discretion to reject advertisements?

188. INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION, supra note 186, at 44, 45.
189. Nixon & Ward, supra note 185, at 9.
190. INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION, supra note 186, at 51.
191. Compare INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION, supra note 186, at 52 (twenty-two
states without competitive dailies), with Nixon & Ward, supra note 185, at 9 (eleven states
out of forty-eight). Twelve other states had only one city with competitive dailies in 1960.
INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL

UNION, supra note 186, at 53.

192. The ad was worded to be similar to the copy at issue in two recent advertising
cases, Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967);
Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority, 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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The few advertising directors who deviated from an industry policy' 93 by responding
did so with vague replies. These responses are set out below:
From the manager of the Advertising Acceptability Department of The New York
Times:294
"(I) The basis of our standard is that a newspaper has the right to accept or
decline advertising as it sees fit. My department is concerned with the acceptance
or rejection of advertising for The Times.
"(2) We enclose copies of editorials on the subject95 and copies of our Standards

"(3) As manager of the Advertising Acceptability Department, I generally decide
which ads The Times should accept and which ads should be rejected. However, I may
decide that a particular advertisement should be referred to a vice president or to
legal counsel.
"(4) We would accept such an ad after gathering information about Women for
Peace and satisfying ourselves that we had no reason to reject it. We also would
check as to whether the quotation of President Kennedy was accurate.
"(5) We would not accept such an ad. We decline ads calling upon our readers
to violate the law.196
"(6) Essentially the same as the answer to No. 4.
"(7) We are guided by the standards set forth in No. 1, consonant with the basic
principles of a free press."
A representative of The Washington Post replied:197
"The importance of protecting the interests of Washington Post readers and the
community and of maintaining the newspaper's standards of taste and decency upon
which reader confidence is based, compels us, through our Acceptance Committee,
to review all advertising copy with care. And, every effort is made to be fully objective in both the evaluation of advertisements and in the application of the following general standards:
"Advertising material of whatever kind-general, retail, classified or so-called
'reader-type'- must NOT: (1)violate any federal, state or local law; (while
every reasonable effort is made to ascertain the legality of content, obviously we
cannot be positive in all cases, and acceptance is clearly not conclusive of the content's
legality); (2) be self-evidently untrue, misleading, deceptive, or otherwise of fraudulent character; (3) offend religious or moral sensibilities of the community; (4)
defame the reputations of individuals, groups, organizations, or institutions - whether
or not such defamation would be actionable under the law; (5) be in violation of
the laws and public policy respecting equality of treatment and non-discrimination on

193. The author learned after sending the questionnaire that the press associations
advise publishers not to respond to such inquiries and not to elaborate on reasons for
refusing advertisements.
194. Letter from Vincent Redding to William M. Douberley, Dec. 30, 1968.
195. See editorials from the Dec. 28, 1961, and Dec. 20, 1963, issues of the Times.
196. The reasoning of The Times here is questionable. Julian Bond was not convicted
for violation of a law when he stated his support of "the men in this country who ard
unwilling to respond to the military draft," and his anxiousness "to encourage people not
to participate in it for any reason they choose." Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 133-34 (1966).
The language "resist the draft" was chosen specifically because it does not necessarily
connote an illegal act.
197. These standards were attached to a letter from Joseph P. Lynch, Vice President,
to William M. Douberley, July 17, 1969. His specific replies were not released for publication.
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basis of race, creed, color or national origin; (6) make unfair or disparaging mention
of any competitor, person or organization."
From the Miami Herald and The Miami News:198
"Our measuring device for ads is very simple. We use the criteria of good taste
to check our advertising. In other words, we do not have nude pictures of night
club or hotel show entertainers in the paper. We demand that they wear some
clothing. As to your specific questions, we would accept, I am sure, the ad in your
paragraph number 4. I don't believe we would accept the one on paragraph number
5 because we would not consider a picttire of a burned child in good taste for a
newspaper that goes into the home, and particularly one that is read at the breakfast table. As for your paragraph 6, I would say that we would read the entire
copy of this ad and make judgment after we have seen the specific ad."
From the St. Petersburg Times and Evening Independent:199
" (1)We have published 'Standards of Advertising Acceptability' and 'Political
Standard' . . . . (2) No, we do not have a separate standard to apply to non-commercial 'advertorials.' (3) The advertisements are subject to this department's discretion and our standards are printed in the main. However, we do use our own
arbitrary criteria as to 'taste,' 'decency,' 'fraud,' 'misleading,' etc. where sum total
awareness stands us in good stead. (4) Yes, we would accept the 'Women for
Peace' ad using the same criteria as we do for political copy. (5) We would accept
the copy; we would scrutinize the photo. If it were too garish and maudlin and
non-acceptable according to our own editorial standards, we would not accept an
unretouched photo of the kind you indicate. (6) Yes, we would accept same. Again,
as in (4) and in (5) the complete disclosure of those paying for the ad would
have to be made. . . . (8) It is our business to edit and print a newspaper suitable
for in-home readership for all ages. Obviously, there are many advertising areas
that need to be scrutinized with the same sincere diligence as our own editorial
columns. We do have a rather intricate editorial stylebook that is a pacesetter for
the tone and the bearing of our image. In a measure we are also edited by our
readers who rise in righteous indignation and make their wants and feelings known.
The accepted mores sometimes have to be 'felt' rather than delineated in binding
prose. In the last analysis we reserve the right to edit our paper and as advertising
occupies 62% of the space delivered to the reader, we find it proper and incumbent
to screen its messages with the same zealous approach. You'll note printed policies
and regulations appear in all the material that the advertising public receives from
US ...

."200

198. Letter from Lester R. Barnhill, General Advertising Manager, to William M.
Douberley, Dec. 16, 1968.
199. Letter from Laurence T. Herman, Advertising Director, to William M. Douberley,
Jan. 2, 1969.
200. It is obvious that there is a distinction between theory and practice in the application of these regulations. The St. Petersburg Times accepted the advertisements submitted although its most recent statement of acceptability standards states: "No advertising
is acceptable . . . which . . . will irritate the sensibilities of, or result in harm or insult to

any large segment of its readership." Preface to ST. PETERSBURG TiMiEs, ADVERTISING STANDARDS
OF ACCEPTABILITY (June 1, 1969). The New York Times, on the other hand, espouses a very
liberal advertising acceptability standard, but it found that some of the advertisements might
be refused for various reasons. Standards, then, are not conclusive, but they at least give
some indication of the newspaper's attitude. Questionnaire reply from The New York Times,
Appendix II supra.
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